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THE POSSIBILITY AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE RECOGNITION OF PRESCRIPTIVE 
AVIGATION EASEMENTS BY STATE 
COURTS 
DAVID CASANOVA* 
Abstract: As an increasingly greater number of Americans travel by air, 
the amount of flights required to accommodate this greater demand 
must necessarily increase. To cope with the greater number of flights, 
either new airports must be built or existing airports must expand their 
operations. Neighboring residents of these new or expanded airports 
will be burdened by the noise associated with the increased air traffic. 
This Note takes a state by state look at the ability of airports to acquire 
prescriptive avigation easements that shield the airports from lawsuits by 
those neighboring residents affected by airport operations. The Note 
analyzes the status of prescriptive avigation easements in several states 
that have already addressed the issue of their recognition, examines the 
consequences of the recognition of prescriptive avigation easements, 
and studies the trend toward the recognition of prescriptive avigation 
easements that may be influential to the large majority of states that 
have not yet addressed this issue. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the time since Orville Wright made the first successful pow-
ered flight on December 17, 1903 at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, 
Americans have embraced air travel like no other country on earth.1 
The United States alone accounts for approximately forty percent of 
all commercial aviation and fifty percent of all general aviation in the 
world.2 There are currently over 18,000 airports of various sizes in op-
eration in the United States supporting this enormous volume of air 
* Articles Editor, BOSTON COllEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAw REVIEW. 2000-01. 
1 See generally FED. AVIATION ADMIN. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF TRANSP., REp. No. 
DOT/FAA/ ASC96-1 , 1996 AVIATION CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT PLAN (1996) [hereinafter 
FED. AVIATION ADMIN.]. Avigation pertains to the "navigation of aircraft." WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 151 (1986). 
2 See National Civil Aviation Review Commission, Airport Development Needs and Financ-
ing options, available at http://www.faa.gov/ncarc/whitepaper/airports/index. html (last 
visited June 4,1997). 
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traffic. ll According to Federal Aviation Administration estimates, the 
number of aircraft operations is expected to increase from about 
sixty-two million in 1995 to 74.5 million by 2007-a nineteen percent 
increase.4 
While the growth of air travel has been of enormous benefit to 
the average American, this growth has come at a considerable cost to 
the many persons residing in close proximity to airports.5 Those who 
own property neighboring many of these airports have faced several 
serious problems, the most obvious of which is the high level of noise 
generated by aircraft using the nearby airports.6 Noise associated with 
airport operations can disrupt daily life, cause emotional distress, af-
fect commercial enterprises, and result in the reduction of neighbor-
ing property values.7 
Owners of property neighboring airports have attempted to rem-
edy the damages imposed on their property through legal channels.8 
Many property owners have brought lawsuits seeking reparations for 
the monetary damages caused to their property and their persons by 
airport operations,9 while others have sought injunctions to cease air-
port activity altogether.10 But there may be a serious obstacle to any 
lawsuit brought by a property owner against a neighboring airport.ll 
Some jurisdictions have extended the concept of prescriptive 
easements-the idea that certain rights can be acquired simply by the 
passage of timelL-to airport operations. III As a result, property own-
3 See id. 
4 See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 1, at 15. For the same period, the number of 
enplanements (plane boardings) is expected to increase fifty-nine percent the higher 
growth rate for enplanements is attributable to higher load factors and larger seating ca-
pacity for passenger aircraft. See id. 
S See, e.g., Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 
1605 (1990); Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 86 (1962); United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259 (1946). 
6 See, e.g., Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1605; Griggs, 369 U.S. at 86; Causby, 328 U.S. at 
259. 
7 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1605; Griggs, 369 U.S. at 86; Causby, 328 U.S. at 259. 
8 See, e.g., Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1605; Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 69-70 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1986); Causby, 328 U.S. at 259. 
9 See, e.g., Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1605; Causby, 328 U.S. at 259. 
10 See, e.g., Christie, 719 P.2d at 69-70. 
11 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609 
(1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie, 719 P.2d at 
70. 
12 SeeJEssE DUKEMINIER &JAMES E. KRiER, PROPERlY 810 (4th ed. 1998). 
13 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609; Insituris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie v. Miller, 
719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). 
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ers are precluded from recovering for damage to their property re-
sulting from airport operations due to a neighboring airport's acquisi-
tion of an avigation easement.l4 An avigation easement is an easement 
of use of the airspace above property located within the direct flight 
path of an airport's runway.l5 The issue of prescriptive avigation 
easements has been addressed by a few jurisdictions in the United 
States, but the vast majority of jurisdictions has yet to decide whether 
to recognize their existence.I6 The recognition of prescriptive aviga-
tion easements could be the death of any lawsuit against a neighbor-
ing airport since such prescriptive easements bar any claims against 
the airport brought by property owners affected by airport opera-
tionsP 
This Comment analyzes the current status of prescriptive aviga-
tion easements in the United States. Part I introduces the concept of 
avigation easements and discusses their emergence in American law. 
Part II provides a historical overview of prescriptive easements in gen-
eral and introduces the elements necessary to establish such ease-
ments. Part III describes the concept of prescriptive avigation ease-
ments and outlines the legal implications of their recognition. Part IV 
details the status of the recognition of prescriptive avigation ease-
ments in California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Oregon, Washington, 
and West Virginia, including obstacles to their recognition. Finally, 
Part V outlines trends in the recognition of prescriptive avigation 
easements by state courts. Part V also posits that the expansion of air 
travel in the United States will inevitably force many state courts to 
deal with the issue of whether to recognize the existence of prescrip-
tive avigation easements, but argues that expanded airport operations 
will fail to satisfY all of the elements necessary to establish a prescrip-
tive avigation easement. 
I. AVIGATION EASEMENTS AND THEIR EMERGENCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
An avigation easement is a property right that allows an airport to 
use the airspace above property that is located within the direct flight 
14 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609; Insit01is, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie, 719 P.2d 
at 70. 
15 See County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, 793 F. Supp. 1195, 1204 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992), rev'd, 9 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Westchester 1]. 
16 See discussion infra Part IV. 
17 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609 
(1990); Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie, 719 P.2d at 70. 
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path of an airport's runway. IS The purpose of an avigation easement is 
to allow aircraft to fly at low levels through a given airspace in order to 
take-off from or land on one or more of an airport's runways.I9 An 
airport may be required to obtain an avigation easement when its op-
erations interfere with a neighboring property owner's right to full 
enjoyment of his or her land.20 
It is important to distinguish low-level flights that require an avi-
gation easement from flights at higher, less-intrusive altitudes that 
have not required easements under federal law since the passing of 
the Air Commerce Act of 1926 ("Air Commerce Act").21 The United 
States Code currently states that "[a] citizen of the United States has a 
public right of transit through the navigable airspace. "22 The Air 
Commerce Act explicitly rejected the long-standing English rule that 
a property owner owns everything from the soil to the heavens.23 In its 
1946 decision in United States v. Causby, however, the Supreme Court 
limited the easement-granting effect of the Air Commerce Act to 
those situations in which aircraft flights did not interfere with a prop-
erty owner's right to full enjoyment of his or her land.24 
The avigation easement concept was first recognized in Causby.25 
In Causby, the plaintiffs had been operating a commercial chicken 
farm; the noise and lights from low-level aircraft flights caused the 
chickens to fly into the walls of their coops in fright, resulting in ap-
proximately 150 chicken deaths and the end of the use of the prop-
erty as a commercial chicken farm.26 The Supreme Court held that a 
servitude had been imposed upon the plaintiffs' land by prohibiting 
the operation of a commercial chicken farm. 27 According to the 
Court, although the United States was allowed "complete and exclu-
sive national sovereignty in the air space" under the Air Commerce 
18 See Westchester I, 793 F. Supp. at 1204. 
19 See id. 
20 See Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 89 (1962); United States v. Causby, 
328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946). 
21 See generally Air Commerce Act ofl926, 49 U.S.C. § 40,103 (1994). 
22Id. § 40,103 (a) (2). 
23 See id.; ROBERT R. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 16 (1968) (translating the prhrase 
"Cujus est solum, ejus est summitas usque ad coleum" as "he who has the soil has everything up 
to the sky"). 
24 Causby, 328 U.S. at 267; see 49 U.S.C. § 40,103. 
25 Causby, 328 U.S. at 267. 
26 United Statesv. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259 (1946). 
27 Causby, 328 U.S. at 267. A servitude is "[a] charge or burden resting upon one estate 
for the benefit or advantage of another .... " BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1370 (6th ed. 
1990). 
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Act,28 "if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must 
have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping 
atmosphere. "29 Mter Causby, whenever there is some limit on the ex-
clusive control of one's land or immediate airspace from low-level air-
craft flights, an avigation easement has been taken.3o 
The Supreme Court further clarified its stance on the issue of 
avigation easements in 1962 in Griggs v. County of A llegheny. 31 In Griggs, 
aircraft taking off from and landing at a county-owned airport came 
within 30 to 300 feet of plaintiff's residence, resulting in noise compa-
rable to a steam hammer at regular and continuous intervals.32 Find-
ing avigation easements necessary for the operation of an airport, the 
Court stated that it saw "no difference between [the airport's] respon-
sibility for the air easements necessary for operation of the airport 
and its responsibility for the land on which the runways were built. "33 
The Court thus firmly established that avigation easements, when re-
quired, were equivalent to any other property right necessary for the 
operation of an airport.34 By holding that airports may be required to 
obtain avigation easements when their operations interfere with the 
rights of neighboring property owners to full enjoyment of their land, 
the Supreme Court has set the stage for much litigation in state and 
lower courts over the existence of avigation easements and the corre-
sponding necessity on the part of airports to compensate neighboring 
property owners for such easements.35 
II. PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS 
An avigation easement is a positive easement which gives one a 
right to enter or perform an act on another's land.36 As with other 
positive easements, avigation easements may be acquired by prescrip-
28 [d. at 260 (internal citations omitted). 
29 [d. at 264. 
M Causby, 328 U.S. at 267. 
~1 Griggsv. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1962). 
~2 [d. at 86. 
~3 [d. at 89. 
~4 [d. at 89-90. 
35 Griggs, 369 U.S. at 90; United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946); see, e.g., 
Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App.3d 1602, 1609-10 
(1990); Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). 
36 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 12, at 783 (contrasting positive easements with 
negative easements, which forbid a property owner from doing something on his own 
land); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 458 cmt. e (1944) (stating negative easements can 
only be created expressly, not via prescription) . 
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tion.37 This section introduces the concept of prescriptive easements, 
traces its historical basis, and outlines the elements necessary to estab-
lish a prescriptive easement. 
A. Prescriptive Easements in General and Their Historical Basis 
The doctrine of prescriptive easements is closely related to the 
doctrine of adverse possession.38 In fact, courts often confuse the two 
doctrines.39 Both rest upon the idea that certain rights can be ac-
quired simply by the passage of time.40 Moreover, pursuant to both 
doctrines, the running of a statute of limitations upon a cause of ac-
tion allows a ripening of some property right.41 Under adverse posses-
sion, the property right that ripens is one of possession whereby the 
original possessor is denied possession in favor of the adverse posses-
sor.42 A successful claim of adverse possession results in a change of 
title.43 Under a prescriptive easement, however, the property right 
that ripens is one of use, not possession.44 The fee owner retains own-
ership of the property, which is burdened by the successful claimant's 
limited right of use of that property.45 
The theory of prescriptive easements arose out of an attempt by 
the English Parliament in 1275 to settle claims of earlier possession.46 
By statute, Parliament prohibited any challenges to rights of posses-
sions that had been enjoyed since 1189 (the year in which Richard I 
acceded to the throne).47 Originally intended to cover only posses-
sion, courts applied this statute by analogy to easements enjoyed since 
1189.48 
With the passage of time, it became increasingly difficult for 
claimants to prove an enjoyment of use against those property owners 
who owned land since 1189.49 Since Parliament failed to amend the 
~7 See Baker, 220 Cal. App.3d at 1609-10; Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. 
App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie, 719 P.2d at 70; discussion infra Part IVA. 
38 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 12, at 810. 
39 See 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITION § 60.03 (b) (6) (i), at 435 
(David A. Thomas ed., 1994). 
40 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 12, at 810. 
41 See id. at 811-12. 
42 See id. at 123 n.l0. 
43 See THOMPSON, supra note 39, § 60.03(b) (6) (i), at 435. 
44 SeeDUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 12, at 123 n.l0. 
45 See THOMPSON, supra note 39, § 60.03(b) (6) (i), at 435. 
46 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 12, at 811. 
47 See id. 
48 See id. 
49 See id. 
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earlier statute, English courts dealt with the problem themselves.5o 
First, the courts created a presumption that any use in existence since 
the living memory of any person had existed since 1189.51 Next, the 
courts created the presumption that any use that had continued for 
twenty years had existed since 1189.52 Either of these presumptions, 
however, could be overcome by evidence that the use had not actually 
existed since 1189.53 
To eliminate the rebuttability of these presumptions, English 
judges created the "fiction of the lost grant. "54 Under the fiction of 
the lost grant, any use that could be proven to have actually existed 
for 20 years created a presumption that a fictitious grant of an ease-
ment had been made, and that the fictitious grant had subsequently 
been lost.55 Since this presumption could not be rebutted by evidence 
that no grant had been made, it was virtually impossible for a property 
owner to defeat a claim of a use easement that had been enjoyed by a 
claimant for at least twenty years.56 
Since American courts could not require the element of con-
tinuous use since 1189, they developed the law of prescription.57 The 
majority of jurisdictions used the analogy of adverse possession to de-
velop the law of prescription. These jurisdictions set the same statute 
of limitations for adverse possession and prescriptive easement and 
generally required the same elements.58 Some American jurisdictions, 
however, adopted the fiction of the lost grant.59 Since there is a pre-
sumption that the owner has acquiesced to the use under the fiction 
of the lost grant, the claimant in those jurisdictions must show that 
the use was not permissive and that the owner did not object.6o 
50 See id. 
51 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 12, at Sl1. 
52 See id. 
5~ See id. 
54 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 12, at Sl1; THOMPSON, supra note 39, 
§ 60.03 (b) (6) (ii), at 435. 
55 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 12, at Sll. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 12, at Sl1; THOMPSON, supra note 39, 
§ 60.03 (b) (6) (ii), at 436; discussion infra Part II.B. 
59 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 12, at S12. 
60 See id. 
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B. Elements of Prescriptive Easements 
The elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement vary 
greatly by jurisdiction, but typically can be characterized by a use that 
is open and notorious, continuous, exclusive,61 and adverse.62 These 
elements exist to protect a diligent landowner from having a servitude 
unwillingly imposed on his or her land by an undeserving outsider.63 
The element requiring a use that is open and notorious serves to put 
the property owner on constructive notice.64 Actual notice relieves the 
claimant of proving the element of open and notorious use.65 Moreo-
ver, in most courts, the burden of proof for establishing each of the 
elements of a prescriptive easement is on the party seeking the pre-
scriptive easement.66 
For the applicable state statute of limitations to satisfy the ele-
ment of continuity, the use must be uninterrupted.67 Continuity of 
use does not require constant use during the statutory period, but 
simply that "there be no break in the essential attitude of mind re-
quired for adverse use. "68 The element of continuity of use can be de-
feated by an effective interruption during the prescriptive period.69 
There are three methods of effective interruption: stoppage of the 
use by the owner, stoppage of the use through a statutory procedure, 
or initiation of "a legal action which results in establishing the land-
owner's right to terminate the use. "70 
61 Exclusivity, which is required in a majority of jurisdictions, is defined differently in 
the prescriptive easement context than in the adverse possession context. See id. at 813. 
"Exclusivity does not require a showing that only the claimant made use of the way, but 
that the claimant's right to use the land does not depend upon a like right in others." Page 
v. Bloom, 584 N.E.2d 813, 815 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
62 See, e.g., Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 70-71 (Wash. 1980); THOMPSON, su-
pra note 39, § 60.03(b) (6) (vi), at 438. 
63 See THOMPSON, supra note 39, § 60.03(b) (6) (vii), at 439. 
64 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (SERVITUDES) § 2.16 cmt. h (Tentative Draft 
No.3,1993). 
65 See id. 
66 See THOMPSON, supra note 39, § 60.03(b) (6) (vii), at 439. 
67 Seeid. § 60.03 (b) (6) (viii), at 447. 
68 Whittom v. Alexander Richardson P'ship, 851 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Mo. 1993). The abil-
ity to establish continuity without constant use in the context of prescriptive easements is 
also present in the context of adverse possession. See Howard v. Kunto, 477 P.2d 210, 213-
14 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that summer occupancy of a beach house is sufficient 
to establish the continuity element of adverse possession), overruled on other grounds lYy 
Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d 831, 861 n.2 (Wash. 1984). 
69 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (SERVITUDES) § 2.16 (Tentative Draft No.3, 
1993). 
70 See id. § 2.16 cmt.j, quoted in THOMPSON, supra note 39, § 60.03 (b) (6) (viii), at 448. 
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The element of exclusivity is difficult to define in the context of 
prescriptive easements.71 Exclusivity of use, as distinguished from ex-
clusivity of possession, does not mean that the use is exclusive to the 
rights of the property owner.72 Most courts, as well as the Restatement 
(Third) of Property, find that exclusivity of use is satisfied if the use of 
the claimant can be distinguished from that of the general public.73 
The element of adversity of use merely means that the claimant 
acted against the owner's interest, or rather acted under the claim-
ant's own authority.74 Since the use is against the owner's interest, it is 
assumed that a property owner would attempt to prevent any adverse 
use before the running of the applicable state statute of limitations.75 
In the context of prescriptive avigation easements, the practical 
difficulty that a property owner faces in legally preventing any adverse 
use by an airport, namely physically preventing aircraft from flying 
over one's property, makes this element the most difficult to establish 
by an airport. 76 
III. PRESCRIPTIVE AVIGATION EASEMENTS AND THE LEGAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR RECOGNITION 
A prescriptive avigation easement is acquired if aircraft intrusions 
into a property owner's airspace occur for such a time that, under the 
applicable state statute of limitations, the property owner is unable to 
assert any claims based on the taking of the easement.77 The idea that 
prescriptive rights of flight could possibly be acquired has been pres-
ent since at least the 1930s, even if courts at the time seemed unwill-
ing to hold that such rights had been acquired.78 Courts in several 
states now openly accept that such prescriptive rights to airspace can 
71 See THOMPSON, supra note 39, § 60.03 (b) (6) (viii), at 445. 
72 See id. § 60.03 (b)(6) (viii), at 446. 
7~ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (SERVITUDES) § 2.16 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No.3, 
1993); see THOMPSON, supra note 39, § 60.03 (b) (6) (viii), at 446. 
74 See THOMPSON, supra note 39, § 60.03(b) (6) (viii), at 440. 
75 See id. 
76 See Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867, 869-70 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1968); discussion infra Part IV.D.l. 
77 See Pamela B. Stein, The Price of Success: Mitigation and Litigation in Airport Growth, 57 
J. AIR L. & COM. 513, 542 (1991). 
78 See Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 759 (9th Cir. 1936) (stating that "[i]t 
is generally held that an easement of or in the air may not be obtained by prescription"); 
Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385, 393 (Mass. 1930) (stating that "[n]o pre-
scriptive right to any particular way of passage could be acquired" because trespass did not 
occur in the same place in the airspace); see also WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 191. 
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indeed be acquired.79 Such prescriptive rights, however, can also be 
lost via counter-prescription by the erection of a barrier to the ease-
ment for the applicable statutory period.80 
The prescriptive avigation easement issue may arise in a lawsuit in 
one of two ways. Most often, the issue is raised by a defendant airport 
as an affirmative defense to an inverse condemnation81 or nuisance82 
action by one or more neighboring property owners.83 The issue can 
also arise when a plaintiff airport seeks a declaratory judgment or an 
i~unction84 against one or more neighboring property owners to 
force the removal of some obstruction to aircraft access to the air-
port's runway-typically trees.85 
As with the recognition of any prescriptive easement, the recog-
nition of a prescriptive avigation easement has several legal implica-
tions for the burdened property owner.86 Such an easement results in 
the imposition of a nonconsensual, uncompensated burden on a 
property owner's estate.87 Moreover, it also prevents a property owner 
from recovering under several causes of action.88 
Prescriptive avigation easements impose a burden on a property 
owner's estate without his or her consent and, in many jurisdictions, 
79 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609 
(1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie v. Miller, 
719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); discussion infra Part IV.A. 
80 See Strother v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 211 P.2d 624, 627-28 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1949); seealmWRIGHT, supra note 23, at 191. 
81 In an inverse condemnation action, a property owner institutes a suit against a gov-
ernment entity alleging that the government's actions have effectively constituted a taking 
of property. The claimant's objective is a forced purchase of the affected property. See 
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 12, at 1168. 
82 There are two types of nuisance: public nuisance and private nuisance. See id. at 
745-46. A private nuisance arises when one's actions result in an unreasonable interfer-
ence with the use and enjoyment of another's land. See id. at 745. A public nuisance is an 
act which interferes with the interests of the public at large. See id. at 745-46. 
83 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1606; Christie, 719 P.2d at 70. 
84 A declaratory judgment is a "[s]tatutory ... remedy for the determination of ajusti-
ciable controversy where the plaintiff is in doubt as to his legal rights," while an injunction 
is "[a] court order prohibiting someone from doing some specified act or commanding 
someone to undo some wrong or injury." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 409, 784 (6th ed. 
1990). 
85 See County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, 76 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 1996); Shipp 
v. Louisville &Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968). 
86 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609-
10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal App. 3d 10, 21-22 (1989); Petersen v. 
Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 70 (Wash. 1980). 
87 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609-10; Petersen, 618 P.2d at 70. 
88 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609-10; Insitoris, 210 Cal App. 3d at 21-22. 
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without compensation.89 In Petersen v. Port of Seattle, the Supreme 
Court of Washington stated that a prescriptive avigation easement, "if 
prescriptively acquired, would not be compensible. ''90 In Baker v. 
Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, the California Court of 
Appeal stated that "[ t] here was nothing to preclude plaintiffs from 
suing [the airport's previous owner] for nuisance when it occurred, 
thereby interrupting [the previous owner's] prescriptive use.''91 Since 
the airport's previous owner had acquired a prescriptive avigation 
easement, the defendant airport "was not required to compensate 
[the plaintiffs] for the easement ... and could transfer it to [the cur-
rent owner] ... .''92 
In addition, prescriptive avigation easements prevent a property 
owner from recovering under several causes of action, including ac-
tions based on public and private nuisance,93 emotional distress,94 and 
inverse condemnation.95 Indeed, a finding of a prescriptive avigation 
easement will likely bar recovery under a nuisance theory for the 
noise and vibration of low-level aircraft flights.96 Two cases from the 
California Court of Appeal illustrate this theory.97 
In Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, the plaintiff property owner al-
leged that the noise level from low-level flights over plaintiff's prop-
erty constituted a nuisance.98 The California Court of Appeal held 
"that the defendant's acquisition of an avigation easement over plain-
tiff's property interest precludes recovery for property damage on ei-
ther public or private nuisance theory. ''99 Similarly, in Baker, the plain-
tiff property owners claimed that the noise, smoke, and vibrations 
from low-level aircraft flights to and from the defendant airport cre-
ated a nuisance that interfered with the use and enjoyment of their 
89 See BaRer, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609-10; Petersen, 618 P.2d at 7-0. 
90 618 P.2d at 70. The Supreme Court of Washington did not, however, find that a pre-
scriptive avigation easement had been acquired in this case. See id. at 71; discussion infra 
Part IV.C.3. 
91 Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609. 
92 Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App.3d 1602, 1609 
(1990). 
9~ See BaRer, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609; Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal App. 3d 
10,22 (1989). 
94 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1610; Insitmis, 210 Cal App. 3d at 21. 
95 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609; see also Insitmis, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 22. 
96 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1610; Insitmis, 210 Cal App. 3d at 22. 
97 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1605, 1610; Insitmis, 210 Cal App. 3d at 22. 
98 Insitmis, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14. 
99 Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal App. 3d 10,22 (1989). 
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property.100 Again the California Court of Appeal, citing Insitoris, held 
that the acquisition of a prescriptive avigation easement precluded 
recovery under either a public or private nuisance theory.lOl 
Some states allow recovery for emotional distress resulting from a 
successful claim of nuisance.102 Barring recovery under a nuisance 
theory due to the acquisition of a prescriptive avigation easement also 
prevents recovery for any emotional distress resulting from the nui-
sance of the continuous roar of low-level flights over one's home in 
any state in which this cause of action is recognized. l03 The California 
Court of Appeal, in Baker, found that the defendant airport had "ac-
quired a prescriptive easement from [the previous airport owner] to 
do the very things alleged by plaintiffs as a basis for recovery of dam-
ages for emotional distress."104 In that court's view, the preclusions 
accompanying the acquisition of a prescriptive avigation easement 
"include[d not recovering from] emotional distress suffered by any of 
the plaintiffs by reason of the permitted uses. "105 
Since many airports are owned by government entities, not pri-
vate parties, claims based on inverse condemnation are often brought 
against the government entities that own the airports.106 The presence 
of a prescriptive avigation easement will likely prevent a homeowner 
from recovering the loss of the market value of his or her land under 
a claim of inverse condemnation. l07 In both Baker and Insitoris, the 
California Court of Appeal found that prescriptive avigation ease-
ments had been acquired.l08 Consequently, the plaintiffs were pre-
cluded from bringing suit against the respective government entities 
under inverse condemnation.109 
100 Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App.3d 1602, 1605 
(1990). 
101 See id. at 1609-10 (citing Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14). 
102 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1610; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 21. 
103 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1610; Insitoris, 210 Cal App. 3d at 21. 
104 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1610. 
105Id. 
106 See, e.g., Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 
1605 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal App. 3d 10, 14 (1989). 
107 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 18. 
108 Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609; Insitoris, 210 Cal App. 3d at 14. 
109 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 18. 
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IV. STATUS OF PRESCRIPTIVE AVIGATION EASEMENTS IN STATE 
COURTS 
411 
To date, courts in most states have not dealt with the possibility 
that airports in their respective jurisdictions might be able to acquire 
prescriptive avigation easements. The only two states to have recog-
nized the existence of prescriptive avigation easements are California 
and Oregon. l1O The only state court that has refused to accept the ex-
istence of prescriptive avigation easements is the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia. l11 A few other state courts have not ruled 
out the possibility that prescriptive avigation easements may be ac-
quired, but have yet to recognize that one has been acquired based on 
the facts before them.ll2 
A. State Courts That Recognize the Existence of Prescriptive Avigation 
Easements 
1. California 
The California Court of Appeal has upheld the existence of pre-
scriptive avigation easements in two cases.ll3 California decisions prior 
to 1989 acknowledge the existence of prescriptive avigation ease-
ments. However, rather than running the statute of limitations from 
the point in time when the noise intrusion actually commenced, these 
decisions delay the running of the statute of limitations for a cause of 
action until the time when the plaintiffs were first made aware that 
the aircraft noise could have an effect on the value of their prop-
erty.114 
In Drennan v. County of Ventura in 1974, the California Court of 
Appeal stated, "[w]e tend to disagree with plaintiff's contention that 
in this state an avigation easement may not be acquired by prescrip-
110 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609-10; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie v. 
Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). 
III SeeSticklen v. Kittle, 287 S.E.2d 148, 155 (W. Va. 1981). 
112 See County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, 629 A.2d 1084, 1088 (Conn. 
1993), certifying questions from 986 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Westchester 11]; Peter-
sen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 7I (Wash. 1980); Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County 
Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968). 
m See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App.3d 1602, 
1609-10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal App. 3d 10, 14 (1989). 
114 See Smart v. City of Los Angeles, 112 Cal. App.3d 232, 238 (1980); Drennan v. 
County of Ventura, 38 Cal. App. 3d 84, 88 (1974). 
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tion .... "115 The plaintiffs in that case owned the land over which air-
craft flew when arriving at and departing from defendant's airport.1l6 
The plaintiffs, however, did not actually live on the land at issue.1l7 
The court held that the plaintiff property owners' absence from the 
land made it impossible for the defendant airport to "interfere sub-
stantially with plaintiffs' actual use and enjoyment of their land since 
there was no such use and enjoyment. ... [T]his being so, no pre-
scriptive easement to overfly plaintiffs' land was acquired."1l8 
Later, in the 1980 decision of Smart v. City of Los Angeles, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal came to a similar conclusion.1l9 The plaintiff 
in that case owned a vacant parcel of land that was overflown by air-
craft from the defendant airport.120 The plaintiff brought an action 
against the City of Los Angeles, the municipal owner of the airport, 
for inverse condemnation and nuisance after a prospective buyer of 
the plaintiff's land was refused financing because of the high level of 
noise emanating from overflying jet aircraft.121 Applying the rationale 
of Drennan to establish a date of accrual of plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion,122 the court found that "[t]he reduction in the value of the 
property did not have a significant impact upon plaintiff until he at-
tempted to sell. "123 According to the court, the prescriptive period did 
not commence until the plaintiff was made aware of the reduction in 
property value.l24 Consequently, as a result of fixing a later com-
mencement date for the prescriptive period, the court held that the 
defendant airport had not yet acquired a prescriptive avigation ease-
ment.125 
More recent decisions, however, have made it easier for airports 
in California to establish prescriptive avigation easements by recogniz-
ing causes of action based on the point in time at which the noise 
from the aircraft was sufficient to constitute a legal taking of the 
plaintiff's property by the government, regardless of the plaintiff's 
115 Drennan, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 86. 
lI6 See id. at 86. 
lI7 See id. 
liB Id. at 88. 
119 112 Cal. App. 3d 232, 238 (1980). 
120 Id. at 234. 
121 See id. at 233-35. 
122 See id. at 238. 
125Id. 
124 See Smart v. City of Los Angeles, 112 Cal. App. 3d 232, 238 (1980). 
125 See id. at 237-38. 
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knowledge of the commencement of a cause of action.I26 In Insitoris v. 
City of Los Angeles, decided in 1989, plaintiffs had subleased a lease-
hold interest in an airport hotel from January 1969 to May 1978.127 
The court found that the noise from aircraft associated with the de-
fendant airport was sufficient to cause the taking and damaging of the 
property at issue inJune 1967.128 The five-year statute of limitations in 
California thus expired in June 1972, resulting in a prescriptive aviga-
tion easement.I29 Thus, the defendant airport was immune to plain-
tiffs' claims of inverse condemnation, public and private nuisance, 
and emotional distress by establishing the acquisition of a prescriptive 
avigation easement. I30 
In Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., decided in 
1990, plaintiff landowners alleged causes of action for inverse con-
demnation and nuisance based on noise, smoke, and vibration from 
the municipally-owned defendant airport.I31 The court found that acts 
amounting to taking or property damage began in 1973 at the lat-
est.I32 As a result, the previous airport owner had acquired a prescrip-
tive avigation easement in 1978.133 The previous airport owner was not 
required to compensate plaintiffs for the easement, and was free to 
transfer it to the municipal defendant in the case.I34 In establishing 
that a prescriptive avigation easement had been acquired, the defen-
dant airport successfully defended against claims of inverse condem-
nation, public and private nuisance, and emotional distress. I35 Thus, 
the California Court of Appeal now recognizes the existence of pre-
scriptive avigation easements.I36 
126 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App.3d 1602, 
1609-10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989). 
127 210 Cal. App. 3d at 13. 
128 See id. at 14. 
129 Seeid. 
150 See id. at 22-23. 
lSI 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1605. 
lS2 Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App.3d 1602, 1609 
(1990). 
U~ Seeid. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. at 1609~10. 
156 See Baker, 220 Cal. App.3d at 1609-10; Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. 
App. 3d 10, 14 (1989). 
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2. Oregon 
In its brief opinion in Christie v. Miller, decided in 1986, the Ore-
gon Court of Appeals effectively recognized the legal existence of pre-
scriptive avigation easements, affirming the trial court's dismissal of 
the plaintiffs' action both to enjoin the use of the defendant's private 
airport and to seek damages from nuisance based in part on the ac-
quisition ofa prescriptive avigation easement.137 In this case, the court 
found that the plaintiffs should have been aware of aviation activity 
since 1970.138 Additionally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument 
that no prescriptive avigation easement could arise, reasoning that the 
element of continuity could not be satisfied because aircraft do not 
continuously land or take off.139 
The Oregon Supreme Court was the first court in the country to 
allow neighboring plaintiffs to state a cause of action against a defen-
dant airport for inverse condemnation due to noise nuisance from 
aircraft in the landmark decision of Thornburg v. Port of Portland.l40 
The Oregon Supreme Court, however, has yet to address the accep-
tance of prescriptive avigation easements recognized by the Court of 
Appeals.141 
B. State Courts That Do Not Recognize the Existence of Prescriptive Avigation 
Easements 
1. West Virginia 
The only state court that has unequivocally refused to accept the 
existence of prescriptive avigation easements is the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia.l42 In the 1981 decision of Sticklen v. Kittle, 
the plaintiff airport and concerned citizens brought suit against a lo-
cal school board to enjoin the construction of a high school within 
3,000 feet of the general aviation runway of the airport, arguing that 
the airport had acquired a prescriptive avigation easement.143 This 
decision, however, was handed down before the Court of Appeals of 
137 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). 
ISS See id. 
1S9 See id. 
140 376 P.2d 100, 1l0-1l (Or. 1962). 
141 See Christie, 719 P.2d at 70. 
142 SeeSticklen v. Kittle, 287 S.E.2d 148,155 (W. Va. 1981). The Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of West Virginia is the state's highest court. 
14S See id. at 151. 
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Oregon had decided Christie and the California Court of Appeal had 
decided Insitoris and Baker. 
In Sticklen, the West Virginia court stated that, based on its analy-
sis of cases from other jurisdictions, it was "evident that courts are re-
luctant to support the assertion ... that a prescriptive easement in 
airspace can be obtained over property by continuous overflights."l44 
The court noted that such an easement would be difficult to define, 
would change whenever different types and numbers of aircraft flew 
over one's property, and would create questions of whether different 
easements would be needed for different flight patterns over the 
same tract of land.l45 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 
has yet to reverse this opinion, which is almost two decades old, in 
light of the more recent California and Oregon decisions.146 
C. State Courts That Have Yet to Recognize the Existence of Prescriptive 
Avigation Easements Based on the Facts Before Them 
Courts in several other states have asserted that prescriptive avi-
gation easements may possibly be recognized. However, due to the 
failure of the airports to satisfY all of the elements required for a pre-
scriptive avigation easement, these courts have not yet upheld air-
ports' assertions of prescriptive avigation easements.147 In particular, 
courts in Connecticut, Kentucky, and Washington have refused to 
recognize prescriptive avigation easements due to the airports' failure 
to show that their use of neighboring land was adverse. l48 
1. Connecticut 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in the 1993 decision of 
County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, addressed a certified question 
from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals inquiring whether a pre-
scriptive avigation easement could be acquired in the State of Con-
144 See Sticklen, 287 S.E.2d at 155; Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 
220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1609-10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 
10,14 (1989); Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68,70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). 
145 See Sticklen, 287 S.E.2d at 155; discussion infra Part IV.D.2. 
146 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609-10; Insitons, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie, 719 
P.2d 68 at 70. 
147 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d 1084, 1087-88 (Conn. 1993), certifYing questions from 986 
F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1993); Petersen v. Port of Seattle. 618 P.2d 67,71 (Wash. 1980); Shipp v. 
Louisville &Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867.870 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968). 
148 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1087-88; Petenen, 618 P.2d at 71; Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 
870. 
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necticut. 149 The plaintiff in Westchester was the County of Westchester, 
New York, which owned and operated an airport that bordered the 
Town of Greenwich, Connecticut.150 The runway of the airport abut-
ted the Connecticut border and the approach to the runway was lo-
cated almost entirely above Connecticut. 151 The defendants were 
Connecticut landowners whose trees had grown into the airspace in 
the approach zone.152 Unable to acquire the out-of-state property 
through eminent domain, the plaintiff airport owner claimed that a 
prescriptive avigation easement had been acquired and sought an in-
junction authorizing it to cut down or top the trees that infringed on 
that easement.153 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut noted that although pre-
scriptive easements were recognized by the state, it was essential that 
the use be adverse in order to create a cause of action in favor of the 
property owner.154 Since the property owners were prohibited by the 
Air Commerce Act from obtaining injunctive relief against aircraft 
using the navigable airspace of the United States, the court reasoned 
that the property owners could not have reclaimed the exclusive use 
of the airspace above their property.155 Thus, the airport's use of the 
airspace could not be considered adverse, so no prescriptive easement 
had been acquired.156 
In reaching its decision in Westchester, the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut did not discuss the fact that the defendant property own-
ers could have brought a separate action alleging monetary damages 
based on claims of nuisance or inverse condemnation.157 Although 
these claims would have had merit, the court probably did not take 
this into account because the property owners were not plaintiffs in 
this case, but rather defendants in an action by an out-of-state plaintiff 
airport seeking a declaratory judgment to force property owners to 
cut trees on their property that were creating an obstruction to the 
use of the airport's runway.158 Supporting this fact-specific analysis is 
149 Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1086. 
150 See id. 
151 See id. 
152 Id. at 1086. 
153 Westchester II, 629A.2d 1084, 1086-87 (Conn. 1993), certifYingquestionsfrom986F.2d 
624 (2d Cir. 1993). 
154 See id. at 1087. 
155 See id. at 1088; see al50Air Commerce Act of 1926,49 U.S.C. § 40,103 (1994). 
156 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1088. 
157 Id. at 1087-89. 
158 See id. at 1086. 
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the court's refusal in Westchester to decide whether a prescriptive aviga-
tion easement may ever be acquired in Connecticut.159 
2. Kentucky 
In the 1968 decision of Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air 
Board, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky (the state's highest court at 
the time) faced a fact pattern similar to that which the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut would later face in Westchester.160 The plaintiff 
airport sought a declaratory judgment allowing it to remove the tops 
of two trees on defendant's property, claiming that it had acquired a 
prescriptive avigation easement.161 The trial court found that the 
plaintiff had acquired a prescriptive right to the airspace.162 The ap-
pellate court reversed the trial court's finding of a prescriptive aviga-
tion easement, however, "for the simple reason [that the airport] has 
not exercised adverse rights in the space involved for fifteen years ... " 
since the airport had a federal statutory right to the use of the naviga-
ble airspace ofthe United States.l63 
3. Washington 
In Petersen v. Port of Seattle, decided by the Supreme Court of 
Washington in 1980, the plaintiff property owners lived two miles 
south of the airport owned and operated by defendants.l64 In this 
case, the plaintiffs sought to recover the reduction in the value of 
their property caused by the operations of the defendant airport in an 
inverse condemnation action.165 In defense, the airport argued that a 
prescriptive avigation easement had been acquired.l66 
In Petersen, the court stated that "[p]roof of such prescriptive 
right necessarily includes a showing of uninterrupted hostile use for 
1 0 years which has been open and notorious. "167 The court found that 
159 Westchester II, 629 A.2d 1084, 1088 (Conn. 1993), certifying questions from 986 F.2d 624 
(2d Cir. 1993). Perhaps the issue will be fully resolved when an in-state airport is involved 
in a similar lawsuit. 
160 Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1968); Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1086. 
161 See Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 868. 
162 See id. 
16~ Id. at 870. 
164 See618 P.2d 67,69 (Wash. 1980). 
165 See id. at 68-69. 
166 See id. at 69. 
167 See id. at 71. 
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the defendant airport's policy of paying voluntary sellers the unim-
pacted value of their land and its active encouragement of, and par-
ticipation in, a community group that was designed to find alternative 
remedies for impacted land was evidence of the non-hostile nature of 
the airport's use.168 Thus, the airport failed to satisfy all of .the ele-
ments of a prescriptive easement.169 Consequently, the court affirmed 
the trial court's order for the airport to compensate property owners 
for the reduction in the value of their property.170 
D. Obstacles to the Recognition of Prescriptive Avigation Easements 
As can be ascertained from the above cases, there are two legal 
obstacles to the recognition of prescriptive avigation easements by 
courts. The first obstacle, indicated by some of the above case discus-
sions, has to do with the element of adversity, which is necessary for 
the recognition of all prescriptive easements.l7l The second obstacle is 
the difficulty of defining the precise use allowed by any prescriptive 
avigation easement that may be acquired by an airport.172 
1. The Element of Adversity 
In each of the decisions in which state courts have not ruled out 
the possibility that a prescriptive avigation easement could be ac-
quired, the courts have found that the element of adversity was not 
met.173 In Petersen v. Port of Seattle, the Supreme Court of Washington 
based its finding of non-adversity ("non-hostility," in that court's jar-
gon) on the airport's close relationship with the community and its 
policy of buying out voluntary sellersP4 While the relationship be-
tween the airport's neighborly attitude at ground level and its un-
compensated use of the property owners' airspace may be less than 
direct, it is not difficult to understand the court's reasoning based on 
the facts, namely that the airport's dealings with the surrounding 
168 See id. 
169 See id. 
170 See Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 73 (Wash. 1980). 
171 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d 1084, 1088-89 (Conn. 1993), certifYing questions from 986 
F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1993); Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Shipp v. Louisville &Jefferson County Air 
Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867,869-70 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968). 
172 See Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 548 P.2d 
1085,1090-91 (Wash. 1976). 
173 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1088-89; Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 
869-70; discussion supra Part IV.C. 
174 Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71. 
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property owners were not very hostile,l75 The court might have found, 
however, that the requirement of adversity had been met under the 
more common factual scenario of a neighboring airport that is not so 
friendly with its neighbors,l76 
The reasoning of both the Court of the Appeals of Kentucky in 
Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Board-one of the earliest cases 
dealing with the subject of prescriptive avigation easements--and the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut in County of Westchester v. Town of 
Greenwich-the most recent case dealing with the subject-seems to 
leave little hope that the element of adversity could ever be met by a 
neighboring airport seeking a prescriptive avigation easement in 
those states.177 In Shipp, the highest court in Kentucky found that the 
simple fact that a federal statute had given the airport the right to use 
any airspace necessary for take-offs and landings precluded any 
finding of adversity,l78 The court stated that the right to use this air-
space "is one derived from an act of Congress in its exercise of police 
powers and the regulation of interstate commerce by air. "179 Conse-
quently, the court reasoned that no exercise of that right could be 
considered adverse.I80 
In Westchester, the Supreme Court of Connecticut found that the 
element of adversity had not been met because the property owners 
were forbidden by federal law from obtaining injunctive relief against 
aircraft using the navigable airspace of the United States. I81 The court 
impliedly limited adversity to only those uses of another's property 
that can be completely reclaimed by the property owner.l82 The court 
did not consider any use that could give rise to any other cause of ac-
tion besides complete reclamation of the land (e.g., monetary dam-
ages for continuing or permanent nuisance) to be adverse.l83 The use 
of federal law to defeat the element of adversity in Connecticut and 
175 See id. 
176 Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 71 (Wash. 1980). 
177 Westchester II, 629 A.2d 1084, 1088-89 (Conn. 1993), certifYing questions from 986 F.2d 
624 (2d Cir. 1993); Shipp v. Louisville &Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867, 869-70 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1968). 
178 431 S.W.2d at 869-70. 
179Id. 
180 See id. 
181 Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1088-89. 
182 See id. at 1088. 
18~ Westchester II, 629 A.2d 1084, 1088-89 (Conn. 1993), certifYing questions from 986 F.2d 
624 (2d Cir. 1993). 
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Kentucky makes it seem unlikely that an airport could ever satisfy this 
requirement in those states.I84 
The restrictive view of adversity taken by both the Court of Ap-
peals of Kentucky and the Supreme Court of Connecticut sharply 
contrasts with the view taken by the Court of Appeal of California. 
The Court of Appeal of California does not require that a plaintiff 
have a cause of action for the complete reclamation of land in order 
for adversity to exist.185 Rather, the court has found use to be adverse 
whenever the property owner could have made a claim for nuisance 
or a taking without regard to the property owner's ability to com-
pletely reclaim his or her airspace.186 
2. Difficulty of Use Definition 
The second legal obstacle to the recognition of prescriptive avi-
gation easements by courts is the difficulty of defining the precise use 
governed by any prescriptive avigation easement that may be acquired 
by an airport.I87 The acquisition of a prescriptive avigation easement 
does not give an airport complete freedom over the extent to which it 
can burden a servient estate.188 Such easements, when allowed, are 
limited only to the use that has already been legally recognized by 
prescription.I89 An established prescriptive avigation easement will not 
include any future increase in the volume of air traffic at the airport, 
nor will it include the use of aircraft that are noisier than those for 
which a use has been allowed, such as the use of noisier jet-powered 
184 Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1088-89; Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 
431 S.W.2d 867, 869-70 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968); cf. Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. 
App.1986) (holding that plaintiff property owners, who did not make the argument at 
trial, were precluded from arguing on appeal that it would be impossible for an airport to 
obtain a prescriptive avigation easement since plaintiffs did not own airspace). It should be 
noted that in both Westchester and Shipp, the airports were the plaintiffs and the claims of 
prescriptive avigation easement were raised not as affirmative defenses, but as a means of 
forcing the defendant property owners to trim trees on their respective properties. See 
Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1086-87; Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 868. 
185 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App.3d 1602, 
1609-10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Westchester 
II, 629 A.2d at 1088-89; Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 869-70. 
186 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609-10; Insitaris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14. 
187 See Sticklen v. Kittle, 287 S.E.2d 148, 155 (W. Va. 1981); Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 
618 P.2d 67,71 (Wash. 1980); Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 548 P.2d 1085, 
1091 (Wash. 1976). 
188 See Sticklen, 287 S.E.2d at 155; Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401,548 
P.2d at 1091. 
189 See Sticklen, 287 S.E.2d at 155; Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401,548 
P.2d at 1091. 
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aircraft when the easement allows for only propeller-powered air-
craft.190 Any such uses that exceed the scope of an existing prescrip-
tive avigation easement will require an entirely new easement, be it 
through purchase or prescription.191 
Thus far, however, only one state court-the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia-has justified a refusal to recognize any pre-
scriptive easement partly on the basis of this obstacle.192 In Sticklen v. 
Kittle, the court's concern with the definition of use contributed to its 
holding that no prescriptive avigation easement could be acquired in 
that state. Furthermore, the court stated that this obstacle was one of 
"the practical problems [that] would make such an easement difficult 
to define. "1911 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Trends in the Recognition of Prescriptive Avigation Easements 
Uy State Courts 
The relevant case law in the area of prescriptive avigation ease-
ments shows a general trend toward greater acceptance of the exis-
tence of such easements by state courts.194 Such a trend could be 
influential to the vast majority of state courts that have yet to decide 
whether prescriptive avigation easements should be legally recognized 
in their respective states. 
From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, state court decisions were 
characterized by a reluctance to find that a prescriptive avigation 
easement had been acquired based on the facts presented before the 
courts.195 During that period, state courts in California, Kentucky, and 
Washington refused to find that the elements required to establish 
190 See Stickkn, 287 S.E.2d at 155; Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highlim Sch. Dist. No. 401,548 
P.2d at 1091. 
191 See Stickkn, 287 S.E.2d at 155; Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401,548 
P.2d at 1091. 
192 SeeStickkn, 287 S.E.2d at 155. 
195 Sticklen v. Kittle, 287 S.E.2d 148, 155 (W. Va. 1981). 
194 See. Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App.3d 1602, 
1609-10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie v. 
Miller, 719 P.2d 68,70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). 
195 See Smart v. City of Los Angeles, 112 Cal. App. 3d 232, 238 (1980); Highline Sch. 
Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 548 P.2d 1085, 1090-91 (Wash. 1976); Petersen v. Port of 
Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 71 (Wash. 1980); Shipp v. Louisville &Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 
S.W.2d 867, 870 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968). 
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prescriptive avigation easements had been present.196 Only the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, however, ruled out the pos-
sibility that a prescriptive easement could ever be acquired, due to the 
problems associated with the precise definition of use of prescriptive 
avigation easements and the problem of discontinuity associated with 
increased airport operations.197 
The reluctance to accept prescriptive avigation easements began 
to wane by the mid-1980s.198 With the exception of the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut's decision in County of Westchester v. Town of 
Greenwich, each relevant decision since the mid-1980s has supported 
the acceptance of an airport'S ability to acquire a prescriptive aviga-
tion easement in the airspace of neighboring property.199 Though not 
yet addressed by the highest court of either state, decisions by appel-
late courts in both California and Oregon have recognized the exis-
tence of prescriptive avigation easements in their respective states 
since the mid-1980s.20o 
It may be too early to judge whether the Supreme Court of Con-
necticut's Westchester decision signals the end of the expansion of pre-
scriptive avigation easement acceptance, or whether the decision is 
just an anomaly in the trend towards greater acceptance. 201 Most 
likely, however, the Westchester decision is a mere anomaly.202 First, the 
factual peculiarity of the Westchester case distinguishes it from the usual 
prescriptive avigation easement dispute.203 Airports rarely appear as 
196 See Smart, 112 Cal. App. 3d at 238 (finding use not adverse when aircraft noise 
commenced, but when plaintiff attempted to sell property; thus, statute of limitations had 
not run); Highline Sch. Dist., 548 P.2d at 1090-91 (finding use not continuous due to in-
crease in aircraft operations); Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71 (finding use not adverse because 
airport paid voluntary sellers unimpacted value of neighboring land and because airport 
owner participated in community group to find alternative remedies for land adversely 
affected by airport activity); Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 869-70 (finding no adversity because of 
airport's right to use navigable airspace under federal law) . 
197 See Sticklen, 287 S.E.2d at 155. 
198 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609-10; Insitmis, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie, 719 
P.2d at 70. 
199 Westchester II, 629 A.2d 1084, 1088-89 (Conn. 1993), certifYing questions from 986 F.2d 
624 (2d Cir. 1993); see Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609-10; Insitmis, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; 
Christie, 719 P.2d at 70. 
200 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App.3d 1602, 
1609-10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie v. 
Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). 
201 Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1088-89. 
202Id. 
2O! Id. at 1086-87. 
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plaintiffs in prescriptive avigation easement disputes. 204 Generally, in 
the cases in which airports have appeared as plaintiffs, the airports 
attempt to force neighboring property owners to remove some ob-
struction to the flight paths of the aircraft.205 Plaintiff airports have 
fared poorly in establishing prescriptive avigation easements, perhaps 
because courts are less inclined to recognize prescriptive avigation 
easements when the result would be to force a neighboring property 
owner to perform some service, as compared to when prescriptive 
avigation easements are used as an affirmative defense to prevent a 
property owner from hampering the operations of an airport. 206 
Second, the underlying interstate tension between the New York 
county-owned airport and the Connecticut neighbors is unlikely to be 
repeated in another decision involving the issue of prescriptive aviga-
tion easements.207 Indeed, such tension may have influenced the Su-
preme Court of Connecticut's decision. Moreover, it should be noted 
that the federal district court, prior to the appeal to the Second Cir-
cuit and the subsequent certification of questions to the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut, had little trouble finding that the airport had 
indeed acquired a prescriptive avigation easement.20B 
B. How the Trend Toward Recognition of Prescriptive Avigation Easements 
Will Affect State Courts That Have Not Addressed the Issue 
1. Airports with Consistent Levels of Operations 
In those cases in which the operations of airports have remained 
relatively stable over the years, the general trend toward greater ac-
ceptance of the existence of prescriptive avigation easements by state 
courts could be influential to the great majority of state courts that 
have not had occasion to deal with the issue.209 For example, the typi-
cal scenario occurs when a plaintiff property owner brings suit against 
a neighboring defendant airport for monetary damages or an injunc-
204 Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1086-87; Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 
431 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968). 
205 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d 1084, 1086-87 (Conn. 1993), certifying questions from 986 
F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1993); Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 868. 
206 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1088-89; Shipp, 431 S.w.2d at 870. 
207 Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1086-87. 
208 See Westchester I, 793 F. Supp. 1195, 1208-09 (S.D.N.Y 1992), rev'd, 9 F.3d 242 (2d 
Cir.1993). 
209 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App.3d 1602, 
1609-10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10,14 (1989); Christie v. 
Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). 
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tion.210 In such cases, state courts may be influenced by the fact that 
no plaintiff property owner has successfully withstood a prescriptive 
avigation easement defense since 1980,211 while two state courts since 
that time-California and Oregon-have accepted the existence of 
prescriptive avigation easements.212 
Assuming that the airport's operations have remained relatively 
stable for the applicable statute of limitations, the problem of 
definition of use is unlikely to be an obstacle to any state court that 
must address the issue.213 Courts will simply define the use as that 
which existed for the duration of the statute of limitations.214 Thus, 
airports will likely to be able to establish the element of continuity re-
quired for a prescriptive avigation easement.215 
The element of adversity required to establish a prescriptive avi-
gation easement would likely be a greater obstacle to the recognition 
of a prescriptive avigation easement in any given fact pattern than 
definition of use.216 Courts in Connecticut and Kentucky have found 
that the element of adversity was not satisfied based on the simple fact 
that a federal statute grants a right of use of the navigable airspace of 
the United States.217 Even in those states, however, the difficulty of 
establishing the element of adversity has not led the state courts to 
explicitly rule out the possibility that a prescriptive avigation easement 
could ever be acquired.218 
210 See, e.g., Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1605; Christie, 719 P.2d at 69-70. 
211 See Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 71 (Wash. 1980). 
212 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609-10; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie, 719 
P.2d at 70. 
m See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1608-09; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14. Only the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has justified a refusal to recognize a prescriptive 
avigation easement partly based on the obstacle of use definition. See Sticklen v. Kittle, 287 
S.E.2d 148, 155 (W. Va. 1981). 
214 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1608-09; Insitoris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14. 
215 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App.3d 1602, 
1608-09 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie v. 
Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). 
216 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d 1084, 1087-88 (Conn. 1993), certifying questions from 986 
F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1993); Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Shipp v. Louisville &Jefferson County Air 
Bd., 431 S.w.2d 867,869-70 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968). It should be noted that the establishment 
of the element of adversity is independent of the stability of the operations of the airport 
(i.e., the use is adverse whether there is one flight per day or 100 flights per day). 
217 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1087-88; Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 869-70. In Petersen, the 
Supreme Court of Washington also found that the element of adversity had not been met; 
the facts in that case--the airport's relationship with the community and its policy of buy-
ing out voluntary sellers--are unlikely to be duplicated. Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 
P.2d 67, 71 (Wash. 1980). 
218 See Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1088; Shipp, 431 S.W.2d at 869-70. 
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The Supreme Court of Connecticut's l#stchester decision, al-
though relatively recent, will probably have limited influential value 
on a state court deciding the issue of adversity.219 The oddity of the 
facts of the Supreme Court of Connecticut's Westchester decision, 
which included a rare plaintiff airport and the possible presence of 
interstate rivalry,220 will probably limit the influence of the decision in 
other state courts. Instead, it is more likely that state courts will be 
influenced by the California and Oregon decisions, which have no 
trouble finding the element of adversity to be satisfied in the prescrip-
tive avigation easement context.221 As a result, state courts dealing 
with cases in which airport operations have remained relatively stable 
for the applicable statutes of limitations will likely exhibit a tendency 
to accept the existence of prescriptive avigation easements.222 
2. Airports with Expanding Levels of Operations 
The number of aircraft operations is expected to increase to 74.5 
million by 2007.223 This is a nineteen percent increase from the 1995 
level of 62 million.224 Moreover, the projected expansion of air travel 
in the United States will likely force many state courts that have not 
previously dealt with the issue of prescriptive avigation easements to 
decide the matter.225 
The expansion of air travel will mean increased air traffic at many 
existing airports.226 This increased air traffic will inevitably result in 
more noise.227 Greater noise levels will affect neighboring property 
owners in two ways: (1) those neighboring property owners who were 
previously affected by airport noise will be affected to an even greater 
extent, and (2) those neighboring property owners who were previ-
219 Westchester II, 629 A.2d at 1086, 1087-88. 
220 Id. at 1086-87. 
221 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App.3d 1602, 
1609-10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie v. 
Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). 
222 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609-10; Insitflris, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie, 719 
P.2d at 70. 
W See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 1, at 15. 
224 See id. 
225 See discussion supra Part IV. 
226 See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 1, at 15. Due to the enormous cost of new 
airport construction, capacity enhancement is most likely to be achieved through the con-
struction of new runways and the extension of existing runways at existing airports. See id. 
at 29-30. . 
227 See, e.g., Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 86 (1962); United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256,259 (1946). 
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ously on the fringe of the noise boundary will now be engulfed by the 
increased noise boundary.228 
Many of the affected property owners will likely seek redress in 
court for the increased or newly-created burdens on their property.229 
Defendant airports will almost certainly claim the acquisition of a pre-
scriptive avigation easement as an affirmative defense to any claims by 
plaintiff property owners.230 Thus, state courts that have not previ-
ously dealt with the issue of prescriptive avigation easements may be 
forced to confront the issue due to the expansion of air trave1.231 
While influential in those cases in which an airport's operations 
have remained relatively stable,232 the trend toward greater accep-
tance of prescriptive avigation easements is unlikely to be persuasive 
in those instances in which an airport has expanded its operations. 
The problem is not that state courts that have yet to recognize the ex-
istence of prescriptive avigation easements will be hesitant to do so. 
Rather, the problem is that airports with increased operations will be 
hard-pressed to establish one element of the prescription: continu-
ity.233 
The difficulty with establishing the element of continuity for an 
airport with expanded operations stems from the problem of 
definition of use.234 Any easement that an airport may acquire would 
be limited to the use that has actually been acquired by pre scrip-
tion.235 Thus, while a court may find that an airport had acquired a 
prescriptive avigation easement for its prior level of operations, it will 
deny a prescriptive avigation easement for the airport's expanded op-
erations if those expanded operations have not been continuous for 
228 See, e.g., Griggs, 369 U.S. at 86; Causby, 328 U.S. at 259. 
229 See, e.g., Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 
1605-06 (1990); Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68,70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). 
230 See, e.g., Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1605-06; Christie, 719 P.2d at 70. 
231 See discussion supra Part lV. 
232 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609; Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 
10,14 (1989); Christie, 719 P.2d at 70. 
233 See Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 71 (Wash. 1980); Highline Sch. Dist. No. 
401 v. Port of Seattle, 548 P.2d 1085, 1091 (Wash. 1976); Sticklen v. Kittle, 287 S.E.2d 148, 
155 (W. Va. 1981); discussion supralV.D.2. 
234 See Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401,548 P.2d at 1091; Sticklen, 287 
S.E.2d at 155; discussion supralV.D.2. 
235 See Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401,548 P.2d at 1091; Sticklen, 287 
S.E.2d at 155; discussion supra lV.D.2. 
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the applicable statute of limitations.236 Consequently, the expanded 
operations will require an entirely new easement.237 
Neighboring property owners who bring suit for the nuisance 
created by an airport's increased operations will likely defeat a pre-
scriptive avigation easement defense if suit is brought before the run-
ning of the applicable statute of limitations.238 If neighboring prop-
erty owners fail to bring suit before the running of the statute of 
limitations in those states that have yet to recognize the existence of 
prescriptive avigation easements, then courts in those states may be 
influenced by the general trend toward the greater acceptance of pre-
scriptive avigation easements.239 Should state courts be influenced by 
this trend, neighboring property owners would be left with no legal 
redress for the burdens imposed on their property.240 
CONCLUSION 
The acquisition of a prescriptive avigation easement by an airport 
against neighboring property owners prevents property owners af-
fected by airport operations from asserting any claims against the air-
port for nuisance, inverse condemnation, and emotional distress. 
There is a general trend toward greater recognition of prescriptive 
avigation easements by state courts. In those cases in which airport 
operations have remained relatively stable for the applicable statute of 
limitations, state courts that have yet to recognize the existence of 
prescriptive avigation easements will likely be influenced by this trend 
if and when the issue arises. Airports that expand their operations, 
however, will have difficulty in any state court proving the element of 
continuity that is required to establish a prescriptive avigation ease-
ment. 
236 See Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401,548 P.2d at 1091; Sticklen, 287 
S.E.2d at 155; discussion supraIV.D.2. 
237 See Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401,548 P.2d at 1091; Sticklen, 287 
S.E.2d at 155; discussion supraIV.D.2. 
238 See Petersen, 618 P.2d at 71; Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401,548 P.2d at 1091; Sticklen, 287 
S.E.2d at 155; discussion supra IV.D.2. 
239 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 
1609-10 (1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14 (1989); Christie v. 
Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). 
240 See Baker, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1609-10; Insitons, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 14; Christie, 719 
P.2d at 70. 

